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Abstract
After a period of sustained distress in the early 1990s, Jamaican financial institutions faced
significant liquidity issues by 1996, evidenced by runs on banks by depositors. The
government responded by creating the Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC) on
January 29, 1997, to rehabilitate weak financial institutions and administer a blanket
guarantee on financial sector liabilities. The blanket guarantee covered all deposit-taking
financial institutions, life insurance policy providers, and pension funds registered under the
Banking Act, Financial Institutions Act, and Insurance Act. Within eligible institutions, the
blanket guarantee covered depositors’ funds in licensed deposit-taking institutions, pension
funds managed by authorized institutions, and policyholders’ funds in insurance companies.
The government funded the blanket guarantee through domestic borrowing and FINSACissued notes that were fully guaranteed by the government. In total, the blanket guarantee
covered JMD 262.1 billion (USD 7 billion) in liabilities. Observers credited the guarantee with
restoring public confidence, although Jamaica’s crisis was among the most expensive in
recent history as a percentage of GDP. By mid 1998, FINSAC had spent JMD 73.5 billion (USD
1.9 billion) providing support to the financial sector, with JMD 68 billion going toward
support for the banking sector, covering 1.5 million depositors. The Deposit Insurance Act of
1998 established a limited deposit insurance scheme to replace the blanket guarantee. This
deposit insurance scheme came into effect on August 31, 1998, initially covering depositors
in eligible institutions up to JMD 200,000 per account and gradually raising the limit to JMD
1.2 million as of 2020.
Keywords: blanket guarantee, FINSAC, Jamaica
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Overview
After a period of growth in the 1980s, the
Jamaican economy experienced sustained
distress beginning in the early 1990s (ChenYoung 1998). Amidst these economic
difficulties, the government provided an ad
hoc deposit guarantee and emergency
liquidity to support two large deposit-taking
institutions, Blaise Financial Entities in 1994
and Century National Bank in 1995. The
terms of these individual guarantees were
administered by an existing government
body called Financial Institutions Services
(FIS). In May 1996, CEOs of several life
insurance companies approached the
government for liquidity support. The
government commissioned a working group
to investigate problems within the financial
sector in August 1996. The group discovered
that several more commercial banks were
contaminated alongside the life insurance
companies (Bonnick 1998).
Large numbers of depositors withdrew their
savings from weak local institutions and
deposited them in branches of foreign banks.
Amid continued runs and a growing liquidity
crisis, the government adopted a
comprehensive approach, announcing the
creation of the Financial Sector Adjustment
Company (FINSAC) on January 29, 1997. The
FINSAC mandate was to address the
problems of insolvency and lack of liquidity
within the financial sector. The government
merged the operations of the pre-existing FIS
with FINSAC (FINSAC n.d.; Kirkpatrick and
Tennant 2002; Ministry of Finance 1998).

Key Terms
Purpose: “To protect the investments of
policyholders, depositors, and pensioners” while
restoring liquidity and solvency to weak financial
institutions (FINSAC n.d.)
Launch Date(s)

Announcement:
February 7, 1997

End Date(s)

August 31, 1998

Eligible Institutions

All deposit-taking
financial institutions,
life insurance policy
providers, and pension
funds

Eligible Liabilities

Deposits, pension funds,
and insurance policies,
were covered by the
blanket guarantee

Fees

No fees associated with
guarantee.

Coverage

JMD 261.7 billion

Outcomes

Direct payouts for
depositors and
policyholders in two
banks and three
insurance companies

Notable Features

The guarantee
protected depositors,
life insurance
policyholders, and
pensioners

On February 7, 1997, the Prime Minister announced a blanket guarantee in Parliament. The
blanket guarantee covered depositors’ funds in licensed deposit-taking institutions, pension
funds managed by authorized institutions, and policyholders’ funds in insurance companies
(Bonnick 1998). FINSAC administered the blanket guarantee in addition to its liquidity
support and bank restructuring responsibilities.
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The blanket guarantee was funded entirely by the government. FINSAC received an initial
JMD 6.3 billion (USD 177 million)3 from the Ministry of Finance, with additional funding from
domestic borrowing (FINSAC n.d.; Minister of Finance 1997a; World Bank 2004). Eventually,
FINSAC funded its intervention through the issuance of FINSAC notes. FINSAC issued JMD 75
billion worth of paper to fund its interventions. These notes were fully guaranteed by the
government. The blanket guarantee covered JMD 68.7 billion in deposits, JMD 19 billion in
pension fund value, and JMD 174 billion in individual insurance policies. This totaled JMD
261.7 billion in covered liabilities (Chen-Young 1998; Kirkpatrick and Tennant 2002; Rattray
1999).
The exercise of the blanket guarantee occurred when FINSAC liquidated a failing financial
institution, sold investments to recover capital support, and wound down its operations.
FINSAC placed funds matching the eligible accounts in replacement accounts at stable
institutions, ensuring that no depositors, policyholders, or pensioners incurred losses.
FINSAC assigned the deposit liabilities of five small, failing merchant banks, placing them in
stable institutions. The deposits in these five banks totaled JMD 300 million (FINSAC 1998a;
1998b; Ministry of Finance 1998). FINSAC also created a scheme for policyholders in three
failing life insurance providers, which transferred lump-sum-type policies into the Bank of
Nova Scotia (BNS). FINSAC estimated the cost of this scheme to be JMD 2.4 billion (FINSAC
1999).
Public financing measures meant that the crisis response was expensive for the Jamaican
government (see Appendix). FINSAC intervened in more than 150 financial institutions and
insurance companies, taking direct ownership stakes and making efforts to recapitalize,
restructure, and merge as necessary. By mid 1998, FINSAC support had cost the government
JMD 73.5 billion (USD 1.9 billion), JMD 68 billion of which represented support to the
banking sector, covering 1.5 million depositors (Chen-Young 1998; World Bank 2004).
The government did not originally establish an end date for the blanket guarantee, though
the Minister of Finance expected FINSAC operations to last five to seven years. The Deposit
Insurance Act of 1998 established a voluntary deposit insurance scheme that initially
protected depositors up to JMD 200,000 per account, eventually scaling up to JMD 1.2 million
as of 2020. The new deposit insurance scheme came into effect on August 31, 1998, officially
ending the blanket guarantee (Deposit Insurance Act 1998; IADI 2005; Minister of Finance
1997b).
Summary Evaluation
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the public viewed Jamaica’s blanket
guarantee as credible, evidenced by the lack of further bank runs. However, the fiscal cost of
Jamaica’s banking crisis was among the most expensive in recent history (see Appendix). The
resolution of the crisis was rapid, although growth never fully recovered, failing to return
even to pre-crisis lows (IMF n.d.; World Bank 2004).

3

In 1997, USD 1 was equal to JMD 35.40 (per FRED).
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A former FINSAC chairman argued that issues of moral hazard arose with the extension of
the blanket guarantee. He said that following the announcement of the explicit blanket
guarantee, business managers may have converted liabilities into the categories guaranteed
by the government. According to Kirkpatrick and Tennant of the World Bank, in the period
prior to the explicit guarantee, the individual guarantees provided to Blaise Trust and
Century National Bank resulted in the sense of an implicit guarantee of all deposits.
Kirkpatrick and Tennant report that criticisms of the guarantee focused on its primarily
benefiting a very wealthy minority of the population as well as fostering risk-taking and
imprudence during a time of economic uncertainty (Bonnick 1998; Kirkpatrick and Tennant
2002).
Kirkpatrick and Tennant weigh Jamaica’s crisis response against the counterfactual of a
typical IMF response. Their results suggest that Jamaica’s crisis response was superior to a
hypothetical IMF-style response. The authors hypothesize that the initial step of an IMF-style
response would have been the immediate suspension or closure of troubled institutions.
They argue that such action without sufficient protection of depositors would have led to
wholesale financial panic (Kirkpatrick and Tennant 2002).
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The government announced the blanket guarantee to protect
policyholders, depositors, and pensioners, and to restore confidence in the
financial sector.
The Jamaican financial sector experienced sustained runs in late 1996, as large numbers of
depositors withdrew their savings from local institutions and placed them in branches of
foreign banks. After measures extended on an individual basis proved to be ineffective, the
government took a more comprehensive approach. It established FINSAC to respond to
solvency and liquidity throughout the Jamaican financial sector (Kirkpatrick and Tennant
2002; Minister of Finance 1997a; 1997b).
FINSAC developed several objectives to pursue that mandate. The first listed responsibility
was “to protect the investments of policyholders, depositors, and pensioners” (FINSAC n.d.).
As such, the government announced a blanket guarantee of depositors’ funds, policyholders’
funds, and pensioners’ funds in deposit-taking financial institutions, life insurance policy
providers, and pension funds registered under the Banking, Financial Institutions, and
Insurance Acts on February 7, 1997 (Bonnick 1998; Chen-Young 1998; IMF n.d.).
On March 27, 1997, the Minister of Finance issued a statement reinforcing the importance of
government support of life insurance companies, given the interlocking nature of the
insurance sector and the banking sector (Minister of Finance 1997a).
2. Part of a Package: The Prime Minister announced the blanket guarantee to
Parliament following the creation of FINSAC to rehabilitate financial institutions.
In early 1997, the government moved away from the individualized approach taken in the
early 1990s in favor of a more comprehensive plan. The government announced FINSAC on
January 29, 1997, to handle the rehabilitation of the financial sector4. On February 7, 1997,
the Prime Minister announced the blanket guarantee, administered by FINSAC, to
complement its other crisis response efforts (Bonnick 1998; FINSAC n.d.; Minister of Finance
1997a; Ministry of Finance 1998).
The government established FINSAC with a mandate to promote solvency and liquidity in
the financial sector. FINSAC had three phases to support troubled financial institutions. It
first sought to negotiate a rehabilitation plan with the leadership of the institution. FINSAC
directly acquired or closed institutions for which rehabilitation was not feasible. In those
cases, a second phase of FINSAC operations involved the attempted rehabilitation of
institutions through asset management and portfolio restructuring, as well as leadership
changes as necessary. The third and final phase involved the divestment of assets acquired
by FINSAC, and the winding down of FINSAC operations. In this phase, FINSAC exercised the
guarantee and transferred deposits or other insured liabilities to sound institutions (Bonnick
1998; FINSAC n.d.). This manifested in the assignment of deposit liabilities of five failing
4

For a discussion focused specifically on FINSAC, see Runkel (2021).
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merchant banks and the transfer of lump-sum type policies of three insurance companies
(FINSAC 1998a; 1998b; 1999; Ministry of Finance 1998).
3. Legal Authority: The Ministry of Finance created FINSAC as a limited liability
company using the Companies Act.
The Constitution of Jamaica gave the Prime Minister the power to appoint ministers who
acted as the principal instruments of policy. The Ministry of Finance was responsible for
Jamaican fiscal and economic policy as well as allocating public revenues. The Ministry of
Finance created FINSAC as a limited liability company registered using the Companies Act
(Constitution of Jamaica 2011; Ministry of Finance 1998; Ministry of Finance 2022).
4. Administration: FINSAC administered the blanket guarantee in coordination with
its other crisis response measures.
FINSAC served as a vehicle for government support of the financial sector and the executive
arm of the Ministry of Finance & Planning. FINSAC worked closely with various agencies (see
Governance) (Minister of Finance 1997b).
5. Governance: The Ministry of Finance appointed a board of directors to oversee
FINSAC.
The Minister of Finance appointed a 10-member board of directors tasked with guiding the
operations of FINSAC, including the blanket guarantee. The appointed directors consisted of
the financial secretary of the Ministry of Finance, central bank officials, former private bank
executives, academics, and union leaders. As an organization, FINSAC served as the executive
arm of the Ministry of Finance and Planning (Minister of Finance 1997a; 1997b; Ministry of
Finance 1998).
FINSAC worked closely with the Bank of Jamaica, the Superintendent of Insurance, and the
Securities Commission to streamline operations in the financial sector (Minister of Finance
1997a).
6. Communication: The Prime Minister originally announced the blanket guarantee
in Parliament, and the Minister of Finance made a statement to the media
outlining the government’s comprehensive response.
The Minister of Finance announced FINSAC in a statement on January 29, 1997 (Ministry of
Finance 1998, 1). The Prime Minister first announced the blanket guarantee to Parliament
on February 7, 1997 (Bonnick 1998; Ministry of Finance 1998).
Spokesmen for the government said that the financial rehabilitation measures should not be
seen as bailouts. The Minister of Finance made a statement to the media on March 14, 1997,
to clarify the measures being taken to rehabilitate the financial sector (Dow Jones 1997;
Minister of Finance 1997a). The Minister said, “Notwithstanding the situation, it is
government’s policy to do what is necessary to protect investments of our citizens,” further
stating that this was the reason the government created FINSAC (Minister of Finance 1997a).
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FINSAC operations were regularly communicated to the public through annual reports
(Rattray 1999).
7. Source(s) and Size of Funding: The government directly financed FINSAC
operations, and FINSAC issued government-guaranteed FINSAC notes.
The government funded FINSAC’s rehabilitation efforts, including the blanket guarantee. The
Ministry of Finance provided FINSAC with JMD 6.3 billion of initial funding. The government
borrowed domestically to fund necessary measures (Minister of Finance 1997a; 1997b).
Following the original government provision, FINSAC also raised funds by issuing FINSAC
notes that were fully guaranteed by the government. Bonds could be issued quickly without
approaching Parliament for approval to raise government debt ceilings (Bonnick 1998;
Kirkpatrick and Tennant 2002). FINSAC issued JMD 75 billion worth of paper to fund its
various intervention measures. The government officially took over the responsibility for
bond payouts in 2001 (Chen-Young 1998; World Bank 2004).
8. Eligible Institutions: All deposit-taking institutions, life insurance policy
providers, and pension funds were eligible for the blanket guarantee.
FINSAC extended the blanket guarantee to all institutions registered under the Banking,
Financial Institution, and Insurance Acts (Chen-Young 1998, 1). These included deposittaking institutions, life insurance policy providers, and pension funds (Chen-Young 1998;
IMF n.d.).
9. Eligible Liabilities: The blanket guarantee covered deposits, pension funds, and
insurance policies.
The blanket guarantee protected depositors’ funds in licensed deposit-taking institutions,
pension funds managed by authorized institutions, and policyholders’ funds in insurance
companies. The 1999 FINSAC Annual Report stated that the blanket guarantee protected
JMD 68 billion in deposits, JMD 19 billion in pension fund value, and JMD 174 billion in
individual insurance policies. This amounted to JMD 262.1 billion in protected liabilities
(Bonnick 1998; Rattray 1999).
10. Fees: There were no fees associated with the blanket guarantee.
Jamaican authorities did not impose any fees in connection with the blanket guarantee.
11. Process for Exercising Guarantee: FINSAC placed matching funds in replacement
accounts at stable institutions.
FINSAC exercised the blanket guarantee when it liquidated a failing financial institution and
wound down its operations. For the eight instances in which FINSAC closed deeply troubled
financial institutions, FINSAC took on the liabilities of that institution that were covered by
the blanket guarantee. FINSAC exercised the guarantee by placing matching funds in
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replacement accounts at a stable institution. This ensured that depositors and pensioners
had uninterrupted access to their funds (Bonnick 1998; Kirkpatrick and Tennant 2002).
12. Other Restrictions: FINSAC required the banks that it liquidated to obtain
permission for various actions.
After taking over the deposit liabilities of two merchant banks, FINSAC required the two
banks to receive FINSAC’s permission before paying debts, purchasing or selling assets,
paying shareholders or directors, or making any payments outside the normal course of
business (FINSAC 1998a; 1998b).
13. Duration: The blanket guarantee ended with the introduction of a deposit
insurance scheme administered by the Jamaica Deposit Insurance Corporation
(JDIC).
The government did not originally set an end date for the blanket guarantee but intended for
FINSAC to exist for five to seven years. On August 31, 1998, the Deposit Insurance Act created
a limited deposit insurance scheme, replacing the blanket guarantee (Deposit Insurance Act
1998; FINSAC n.d.; IADI 2005).
The Deposit Insurance Act established the Jamaica Deposit Insurance Corporation (JDIC) and
empowered it to administer the deposit insurance scheme. The JDIC called for every financial
institution to apply for the insurance scheme and pay an initial premium. The deposit
insurance scheme charged an annual fee calculated based on the characteristics of each
individual institution. The scheme initially covered eligible depositors up to JMD 200,000
per account. The government gradually increased the insured amount; it was JMD 1.2 million
as of 2020 (Deposit Insurance Act 1998; JDIC n.d.).
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Appendix
Figure 1: Fiscal Costs of the 1997 Jamaican Banking Crisis Relative to Other Countries
(as a % of GDP)

Source: World Bank 2004, 88.
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